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Any system of better cooperation to maximise collective security is likely to mean that 
we have to accept the constraint of accepting some alteration to the value we have 
previously put upon 'national' security. 
Peter Nailor 
INTRODUCTION  
The text which illustrates the theme of this article is taken from some predictions made 
by the late Professor Peter Nailor of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, over twenty 
years ago.1 Nailor's comment on maximizing collective security during the Cold War, 
placed a question mark over the organic relationship between naval power and the state, a 
relationship that the nineteenth-century American naval theorist, Rear-Admiral Alfred 
Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), had done so much to promote.2 Although the specialist 
community of maritime historians rightly consider Mahan's concepts of sea power to be 
trapped in a narrow historical period, his doctrine that without sea power a nation cannot 
be a power in the world continues to be extremely influential among practitioners and 
strategists. For strategists, his doctrine, suitably modified to incorporate the management 
of sea/land power relations, remains a cardinal component of geostrategic politics.3 
However, the Mahanist view of navies as key measures and instruments of national 
power is increasingly suspect in the modern interdependent world  even in the absence of 
the international collective security system alluded to by Nailor.  
Of course, perceptions of the national interest continue to determine naval doctrine, but in 
the Western world even a realist and neo-realist conception of international relations 
would recognize that in the 1990s sea power is no longer a wholly adequate measure of a 
state's international significance. There are alternative and more manipulative sources of 
influence, beyond state control, which have grown in relative importance, such as control 
over financial markets, and over electronic information and communications. Moreover, 
in the West it is increasingly problematic for navies to act as purely national instruments 
because it is increasingly difficult to define national interests without reference to the 
international context. Of course, national policies have generally taken account of 
international conditions in the past. Alliance designs for war-fighting, for example, have 
obviously shaped the national policies of individual NATO members. But an 
autonomous, national approach to sea power policy may be increasingly difficult to 
sustain as processes in the international system affect national sovereignty. Naval power 
is not immune from these processes.  
This article ignores many aspects of Mahan's theorizing (the quest for Jominian 
principles of naval warfare, support for overseas possessions, the priority of sea power 
over land power, relative naval autonomy within defence establishments, the emphasis on 
building battle fleets, and on a strategy of deterring or destroying enemy fleets). It 
focuses rather on the central Mahanist concern with naval-maritime power as a national 
attribute in the international system, having symbolic as well as instrumental 
significance. Challenges to the national security concept from a Western perspective are 
then examined and exemplified with reference to the protection of ocean trade and 
fisheries. The growth of sea power in the Asia-Pacific is then contrasted with the 
pressures on Mahanism in the West. On balance, however, the emergence of new naval 
powers does not justify abandoning a cooperative theory of sea power as a sequel to 
Mahanism.  
MAHANIST STATE CENTRISM  
Henry L. Stimson once remarked of the US Navy that it frequently seemed to "retire from 
the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his 
prophet, and the United States Navy the only true church."4 But it is not necessary to be 
part of that "dim religious world" to accept Mahan's view of naval power as a key 
instrument of state security policy in the international system. There has been a popular 
credo which says that navies secure national interests in the international system and that 
privileged access to maritime trade and overseas markets, safeguarded by a national navy, 
produces greatness and power. Mahan's view continues to have enormous appeal, 
especially for hegemonic powers and states engaged in nation building.  
Traditionally, this concept of navies as a measure of hierarchy and as instruments of state 
competition has taken precedence over ideas of international cooperation. Maritime 
development has thus been closely linked to theories of dominance in world history. 
Access to the sea, the control of trade routes and the development of port hinterlands 
have been regarded as keys to the rise and fall of states and empires, most recently in the 
writings of Robert Gilpin, George Modelski and William Thompson.5 Not surprisingly, 
too, there has been a huge body of literature on the nuances of coercive naval diplomacy, 
crisis management, presence, poise and showing the flag  mostly from a state centric 
perspective.6 Navies have commonly been regarded as instruments of national power and 
prestige par excellence.7 In practice, too, even though multilateral cooperation has 
flourished to an unprecedented extent, there were some problems in inegrating the 
various national navies. It took almost twenty years from the creation of NATO to the 
establishment of an integrated standing force (Standing Naval Force Atlantic in 1968), 
and although this in turn did much to foster common operations it took a little time for its 
full effectiveness to be developed.8  
SYMBOLS AND INSTRUMENTS OF POWER  
Military power, like historical sites and trappings of authority, serves symbolic functions, 
reinforcing and ratifying belief systems which sustain the nation. As Thomas Franck 
argues, authoritative images "are used to validate and formalize power" because matters 
are taken seriously when they have lineage, pedigree and tradition.9 Large warships and 
powerful submarines fulfil the requirement for symbols of majesty and awe. As John Pay 
has shown, maintaining a large US carrier force with sufficient and suitable aircraft in 
peacetime (i.e., the absence of a war between major powers), will depend upon several 
factors, but their symbolic importance in defining how the United States sees its role in 
the world cannot be denied.10  
However, the symbols have to be associated with some kind of reality if cognitive 
dissonance is not to create delusions of grandeur that outreach the ability to finance them. 
Navies are no longer accurate measures of national power, and may not be accurate 
measures of maritime power. Indeed, there is something of a disjunction between 
maritime and naval power. For reasons discussed below, in a sense the big maritime 
"powers" in the world are the Liberian and Panamanian registry companies. States such 
as Norway, Greece and Sweden have not needed massive naval power to sustain their 
maritime interests. In part this may have been because they could trade under an umbrella 
held up by friendly navies. In part, however, they have been able also to rely on the 
emergence of a maritime regime, which provides a framework for normative behavior.  
The value of navies for fighting wars cannot be denied, though Mahanists may have 
exaggerated the importance of battles at sea.11 But are they so important in the post-Cold 
War era of intra-state conflicts and the requirement among external interventionists for 
"casualty-free wars?" Navies were indispensible in creating and sustaining overseas 
empires, but imperialism (in the colonial and territorial senses), is no longer a goal of 
most ambitious leaders. Indeed, navies are a casualty of "imperial overstretch," the 
contradiction between gain from physical military control and the costs of effecting it.12 
The concept of security has also broadened to encompass non-military issues such as the 
environment and human rights, in which military forces have limited roles. In short, 
power, even symbolically, can no longer be solely equated with the barrel of a gunboat.  
THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT CHALLENGED  
Threats to the formula that navies are expressions of national power also come from 
another direction. As the nature of state sovereignty itself changes, so must the Mahanist 
view that navies are simply instruments of state security. Indeed, in a political sense 
navies have enormous potential to exceed the requirements of national interest, and to 
some extent, traditionally they have done so. The major navies operated a kind of 
benevolent hegemony in fulfilling international good order functions  suppressing slavery 
or piracy and keeping straits open  though usually with hidden national agendas, such as 
protecting markets.  
The foundation of political theory has been the concept of state sovereignty  the state's 
accountability, its representativeness, its monopoly of power and authority over people 
and the autonomous direction of its own fate. This foundation has been increasingly 
challenged on several grounds.  
• The Hobbesian view of the state as having a single will, purpose and judgement 
has been criticized as failing to acknowledge that state policy is the subject of 
bureaucratic rivalry and paralyzing contention.13  
• In capitalist economies, market forces have almost come to dominate the state, 
with the consequence that in many Western societies the state has reduced its 
assets and areas of responsibility in favor of entrepreneurship and commercial 
relations. Further, many clashes in which the state becomes involved are really 
sectoral commercial clashes: French air traffic controllers versus British tour 
firms; Galician, Canadian, Breton and Cornish fishermen against each other.  
• State autonomy is also challenged by competing institutions: from above by 
international and regional regulatory bodies, such as the International Maritime 
Organisation and the European Union; from below by substate nationalism and 
community entities. Indeed, there may be a connection between the two divergent 
trends of globalization and a "virtual epidemic" of micro-nationalism.14 As states 
have lost control to transnational and global influences, communities regard states 
as less relevant to their needs.  
• Finally, it has long been recognized that state autonomy has been limited by 
external influences and globalization processes, especially the diffusion of 
capitalism and the spread of communications. Demographic, economic, 
technological and environmental challenges are all transnational. Increasingly, 
too, concepts of humanitarianism and environmentalism are transnational 
concerns. 
Remarking on these factors, David Held, argues that there is a quantum change both in 
the scope and intensity of global dynamics. States lack the capacity to insist on exclusive 
influence within their borders. At the same time, collaboration has become essential to 
survive and to influence global outcomes, as reflected in the growth of international 
regimes and institutions. In short, states have seen autonomy curtailed but the stage for 
their activity expand, their boundaries both stretched and penetrated. Consequently, "the 
meaning of national democratic decision-making today has to be explored in the context 
of a complex multinational, multilogic international society, and a huge range of actual 
and nascent regional and global institutions which transcend and mediate national 
boundaries."15  
Under such circumstances, holding on to state autonomy and defining the substance of 
state security becomes a taxing business. Some observers assert that clear definitions of 
national interests are no longer possible, and hegemony difficult to exert because state 
sovereignty is collapsing, assailed by global processes and the impacts of non-state 
actors.16  
This is not to say that the idea of national security is redundant. Perceptions of national 
security interests are a starting point for decision-making. The United States was more 
interested in invading Haiti than East Timor. But in an international system of complex 
interdependence and without a definitive enemy it is not easy to detect and define direct 
threats to national security.  
What seems to have happened is that Western states have responded, sometimes 
reluctantly, to the demands of "cooperative security." This evolved without clear national 
interest being at stake or direct threats to national security  as external involvement in 
Cambodia, Somalia, the Adriatic and Rwanda demonstrates. True, a strong swing away 
from such multilateral involvements developed in the United States after the mid-term 
Congressional elections in 1994. The Clinton administration's apparent retreat into semi-
detatchment from multilateralism, pressured by Republican representatives, is a reaction 
to the absence of clear-cut military solutions, particularly in Somalia where the US 
military culture was bruised by a "Vietnam in miniature."17 Nevertheless, for both 
political and military reasons the United States may still be wary about undertaking 
expeditionary warfare without trying to build a coalition. However cosmetic its 
multilateral offshore component, the invasion of Haiti suggests that the United States will 
seek coincidence of national and international interests and international legitimacy in 
preference to "going it alone." In fact, a policy of multinational consultation in 
formulating naval doctrine has been implemented, with early indications that war-
fighting doctrine will give less emphasis to sea control and more to multinational force 
projection ashore. US politicians may appear to be retreating from cooperative security in 
circumstances legitimized by the UN and heading toward a Mahanist emphasis on 
national interests, but US naval doctrine seems set on a "joint and combined" track: 
"joint" with other military branches, "combined" with other navies.18  
Elsewhere, especially in Europe, policy and doctrine is being reformulated to emphasize 
security roles that impinge only obliquely on the security of the individual state.19 This is 
bound to affect the organic relationship between navies and old concepts of national 
interest. At one level the old Mahanist equation remains fairly simple: the purpose of 
navies is to defend national security. And there is little problem in producing an abstract 
definition of national security: "as protection of national territories, dependencies and 
persons and their social, economic and environmental well-being." However, it may be 
an increasingly difficult task for states to give actual substance to that goal of protecting 
their integrity.  
In his examination of the strategic implications for navies of the end of the Cold War, 
Geoffrey Till indicates that the most likely, and appropriate, response by planners is to 
engage in "parametric planning," avoiding threat-specific strategies and maintaining 
balanced and highly versatile forces in order to provide cover against a spectrum of 
contingencies.20 This is a useful approach because, realistically, naval establishments can 
hardly afford protection against all potential threats. The alternative to providing a costly 
"all risk" policy is to take out general insurance, and to underwrite the cover with other 
insurers. The current problem for many states, however, is to clarify the nature of the 
spectrum of most likely risks. The main certainty seems to be that in the post-Cold War 
era it is now difficult to define interstate threats, at least in Western Europe. By the same 
token, however, the difficulty in identifying potential threats that single out particular 
navies makes "spreading the risks" in the form of cooperative security more attractive. 
Singularization only seems likely for lower-level contingencies such as disruption to 
shipping, terrorism, pollution emergencies and fishing disputes.  
Yet even at the low intensity end of the spectrum the problems may be diffuse, the 
contingencies unlikely to be purely national and support for international regime building 
an appealing and viable political goal. This can be illustrated by reference to ocean trade 
and the protection of fisheries.  
SUPRANATIONAL MERCANTILISM 
Mercantilism was a prominent feature of Mahanist strategic thinking. The well-being of 
states depended on trade which, ultimately, had to be safeguarded by naval power. 
However, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that one of the great paradoxes of global 
maritime trade today is that none of the flag of convenience states has a navy, and none 
of the traditional naval powers has a merchant fleet. The mischievious might want to ask 
whether this is merely coincidence. However, the protection of merchant ships in a crisis 
is an interesting illustration of Nailor's point about constraints on the value of "national" 
security.  
Since the break-up of the old nation-based shipping cartels, maritime trade has become a 
truly global, non-national business. Since the 1970s, de-regulation has further de-
nationalized mercantile marines. To take the UK as an all-too-typical case, only 18 
percent of UK's seaborne trade is carried in UK vessels, and the UK register records only 
about 300 ships of more than 500 gross tons. The volume of shipping controlled by the 
UK and dependencies (Isle of Man, Channel Islands, Bermuda, Hong Kong and others) 
as measured by share of the world's tonnage is less than 2 percent, down from about 9 
percent in 1975. By contrast, in 1994 the phoney maritime powers, Liberia and Panama, 
were the largest contributors to the International Maritime Organisation's funds (together 
accounting for 22 percent of its total budget).21 The Liberian register operates out of New 
York, a convenient arrangement when Liberia dissolved into civil war in 1990 and 
became a "failed state." The register continues to operate for the convenience of ship 
owners and traders who want to cut labor costs. However, this system is not so 
convenient when ill-trained crews and substandard "coffin ships" increase the likelihood 
of accidents.22 Nor is it convenient when convenience-registered ships come under attack 
and require protection.  
Most hand-wringing over the decline of national shipping in the maritime community has 
focused on its implications for available shipping and manpower in emergencies. But 
merchant ships are potential demandeurs as well as fournisseurs. Who defends them in a 
crisis? There are no blue-water Liberian or Panamanian navies.  
True, in a crisis merchant shipping owners can reflag in a trice to get the protection of a 
naval power. Many owners rushed to register under a Red Ensign flag during the "Tanker 
War" in the Gulf in 1987-88. But in this situation the national interests being protected by 
the Royal Navy were international good order functions. A frigate could find itself 
safeguarding a non-national ship, a non-national crew, a non-national cargo and 
expenditures in non-national ports. In fact the commercial operations of a protected 
merchant ship may even have been undermining the national economy  the proceeds may 
be going to Norwegian owners, a Greek certification agency, Japanese manufacturers and 
a Filipino crew. In terms of direct national interest all that a frigate may be "protecting" is 
the fee for transferring to the UK register. That fee might be more logically extracted 
directly by the navy concerned through protection money. Opposition to the re-re-
flagging of ships in order to qualify for a free protection service has been opposed by 
seafarers on the grounds that protecting "scab owners" is a misuse of national resources.23  
Obviously, protection of trade and freedom of the seas is a vital interest, even if the trade 
is non-national. However, it is not merely a national interest but a multinational one 
which, quite sensibly, has led to the continued pooling of available resources, both 
merchant and military, during the Tanker War and the Gulf War, for example. The issue 
has been significant in the 1990s in relation to so-called pirate attacks (actually the 
majority in territorial waters) affecting South East Asia. The safety of shipping had 
become a sufficiently serious problem that the idea of an external multinational 
intervention was raised in the press, though not given credence by governments.24 The 
problem of protecting trade nevertheless illustrates the difficulties with the concept of 
autonomous naval power. Even the apparent hardening of maritime territorial jursidiction 
and the creation of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) does not necessarily represent the 
resurrection of Mahanism, and this can be illustrated with regard to fishing resources.  
FISHING RESOURCES  
Autonomy is constrained on the issue of marine resources, though governments are often 
lobbied by private groups to protect their sectional interests in expolitation of the sea. 
Fishing disputes present a graphic illustration of the tension between national (and 
pressure group) interests and the perceived requirements of predictability in an 
international regime. Fisheries protection has been an ancient role for naval forces (or 
their coast guard and maritime police successors)  to support the civil economy.25 As fish 
stocks decline, competition has become fiercer, and the need for naval/coast guard 
protection greater.  
An equally significant approach, however, has been to turn to multilateral regime-
building. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which came into force 
on 16 November 1994, and the later adoption by the General Assembly of the 
Implementation Agreement on Part XI (Deep Sea-bed Mining), may represent creeping 
jurisdiction, but it does not underpin unilateralism. True, the regime protects the rights of 
coastal states, but it is a regime that operates effectively because there is general 
recognition of the mutuality of its provisions. For all its flaws and loopholes, notably on 
straddling fish stocks, UNCLOS strengthens the international maritime regime by 
codifying existing law and buttressing the quest for normative behavior to prevent 
disputes getting out of hand.  
Moreover, apart from the issue of whaling, which is dealt with separately, the UNCLOS 
clauses on fishing protects coastal state sovereignty for exploitation in the EEZ, but with 
the caveat that attempts are made to maintain the ecosystem, manage stocks and ensure 
compliance with its regulations on the part of foreign-registered boats. States have 
perhaps been more energetic in prosecuting non-national fishers than in conserving 
stocks. But the dispute between Canada and the European Union (EU) in March-April 
1995 indicates the limits to autonomy in the exploitation and forcible protection of 
resources at sea.  
Canada and the EU are parties to an additional regulatory body, the 1978 North-west 
Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) and its Standing Committee on International 
Control. The NAFO area is one of the most intensively policed in the world. In 1994, EU 
boats were inspected on average almost every two weeks. However, Canada challenged 
international law on 3 March 1995 by extending its Fisheries Protection Act to permit the 
arrest of Iberian vessels catching Greenland halibut in the high seas outside 200 mile 
zone. A naval vessel arrested a Spanish boat a week later. Whatever the merits of the 
dispute in this particular case and between Canada and the EU in general, negotiations 
actually led to a strengthening, at least in principle, of NAFO inspection and control 
provisions. The EU also obtained an undertaking that Canada would repeal its 
legislation.26 It became apparent that a state cannot expect to strengthen one regime (on 
the exploitation of fish stocks) at the expense of another (the Geneva High Seas 
Convention and customary international law). Indeed, the prospect of anarchy on the high 
seas would not have suited any of the parties. Furthermore, the incident gave added point 
to the multilateral efforts to secure a straddling stocks regime.  
The UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks, convened in 1993, recognized that 
conservation and management within EEZs is affected by what happens outside the 200 
nm zone, and that a holistic and integrated approach to fisheries management is 
necessary. A draft Straddling Stocks Convention was accepted by nearly 100 states in 
August 1995, and was opened for signature on 4 December 1995. It requires 30 
signatures for ratification and could enter into force during 1996. It was accepted as 
inevitable by the EU fisheries commissioner and welcomed by some key states including 
Canada, the UK, Norway, Chile and Japan.  
In bitterly contested enforcement provisions (Articles 21-22), the agreement stipulates 
that all vessels must be subject to boarding and inspection outside EEZs by accredited 
inspectors of states within regional fishing organizations. In cases of serious violation 
where the flag state takes no action, the boat can be diverted "without delay to the nearest 
appropriate port." The boarding parties should "avoid the use of force," although if they 
do use it "the degree should not exceed that reasonably required in the circumstances."27 
The imprecision on this aspect is far from satisfactory, and whether a management 
approach to the high seas as part of the common heritage is unilaterally or multilaterally 
enforced is a crucial political, legal and practical issue. A unilateral approach might be 
cost-effective because the coastal state would have an incentive to ensure compliance and 
its navy may have a comparative advantage in terms of accessibility to fisheries. On the 
other hand, regional or joint arrangements by parties with interests would contain the 
risks of extending national jurisdiction to the high seas, might appeal to small states 
without the means to undertake unilateral enforcement and might diminish the potential 
for disputes since an element of cooperative behavior is invoked. The text emphasizes 
multinationalism and allows in Article 20 for regional agreements to include procedures 
for the authorities of single states to act on behalf of the collectivity and board and 
inspect, arrest and detain fishing vessels flying non-national flags  a procedure adopted 
by the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agreement.28  
In general, then, one can expect that unilateral action will be constrained by the regimes 
within which states seek legitimacy for their actions. There seems little doubt that at a 
functional level states allow their interests to be negotiated in the interests of external 
harmony or through a sense of obligation.29 Moreover, the maritime domain has always 
had peculiarities in terms of contending sovereignties and interests. Over the high seas, 
the principle of mare liberum pertains in spite of the Convention on Straddling Stocks. 
Even within territorial seas, foreign states claim explicit rights of transit and have risked 
conflict to assert those rights, notably the Royal Navy's celebrated claim to transit the 
Corfu Channel as an international strait in 1946. In sum, decisions on a multilateral basis 
may appeal to states that seek political influence, or protection from security threats, 
through an international regime which promises to make the behavior of other states 
more predictable. State policies thereby become "institutionalized" or embedded by the 
multinational context, blurring the distinctions between national and international 
interests.  
To a large extent this is acknowledged in Western states and in some regions, such as the 
South Atlantic and South Pacific, where new levels of functional or security cooperation 
at sea have occurred.30 For example, in March 1995 the Netherlands and Belgium agreed 
to set up a twin command center to control their surface combatants, and the navies of 
France, Spain, Italy and Portugal have joined in the EUROMARFOR (European 
Maritime Force).31 The Royal Navy has also moved along this path. Presenting his vision 
of the Royal Navy's future, the First Sea Lord effectively endorsed Mahan's eclipse. In 
general he did not expect the Royal Navy to be acting alone:  
Except in the case of inalienable national responsibilities, we should look first towards 
partnership and alliance . . . the complex interactions of our membership of NATO, EU, 
WEU, OSCE and the UN . . .. The Royal Navy has an unbroken 400 year tradition of 
being a strategically decisive instrument of national policy . . .. We now stand on the 
threshold of a quite different role: a shift from the tradition of strategic enablement to a 
focus at the operational level of war. By this I mean operations which are conducted 
typically within a single theatre, under unified command and which are inherently joint, 
and probably combined, in nature.32 [italics added]  
However, policies of rational cooperation, together with misgivings about military 
solutions to problems are, as Ken Booth points out, generally Western phenomena.33 
What is the consequence when some states  in Asia for example  regard Mahanism as 
relevant for prestige, nation-building and the furtherance of purely national values?  
MAHAN LIVES!  
Whilst the East-West naval arms race was at its peak, many developing states 
transformed their maritime assets "into key dimensions of domestic and foreign policy."34 
In contrast to trends in the West, the idea that naval power is essential for self-reliance, to 
promote ambition and deter others was mirrored in naval growth in Asia particularly. 
Within the context of general increased arms expenditure, the growth in coastal and 
minor combatants has been spectacular, and submarines and major combatants, including 
helicopter-carrying frigates, are also being acquired by several states.35 Regional threat 
perceptions, archipelagic and EEZ responsibilities and, in some cases, distrust of Western 
intrusion have all played a part in this. In short, Mahan seems to be alive and well and 
living in Asia.  
Maritime security is a major preoccupation in the Asia-Pacific region. The sea is an 
important source of food and other resources, and for many states seaborne trade through 
strategic straits and waterways has underpinned economic growth.36 However, the region 
is politically fractured. In Northeast Asia there are limited experiences of interoperability 
and maritime cooperation is inhibited by widespread suspicions of the intentions inter 
alia of China, Japan and North Korea, in spite of diplomatic rapprochements between 
dyads such as China and South Korea in 1991. There remain numerous disputes over 
sovereignty and maritime delimitations, not least in the islands of the China Seas and 
between China and Taiwan, though there have also been less well-publicized efforts at 
joint exploitation of resources.37  
Perhaps the most difficult issue to assess is the future maritime role of China's navy, 
whose Commander-in-Chief from 1982-88, Admiral Liu Huaqing, has been described as 
a modern Mahan and the Chinese equivalent of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov.38 The Chinese 
Navy, with 59 major warships (destroyers and frigates) and more than 100 submarines, 
and its extensive influence, through the supply of naval equipment to India's neighbors 
for example, has become more active in developing a blue water role. An assertive 
maritime regional policy is underway, and a limited war with Vietnam or the Philippines 
over the Spratlys a strong possibility.  
Nevertheless, this pervasive Mahanist spirit will not necessarily signify challenges to the 
traditional naval powers. First, many of the expanding naval powers, in ASEAN for 
example, continue to have good political relations with the traditional Western naval 
powers. Second, it is difficult to determine whether Asian naval building represents 
substantial expansion or merely incremental modernization; it is probably a bit of both. It 
may be a cause for concern but it does not as yet represent a structured arms race. Third, 
grandiose ambitions to acquire ships and submarines, even second-hand or off-the-shelf, 
is often driven by prestige but tempered by the requirement for large-scale investment in 
shore facilities, infrastructure and personnel training. As India has found, it may not be 
feasible for developing states to sustain a Mahanist momentum.39  
In sum, interpretations of naval expansion in the Asia-Pacific as a threat may be 
exaggerated, though there is certainly potential for regional naval competition.40 The 
most appropriate responses of the post-Mahan powers may be to encourage political 
structures which establish norms of behavior and extend the maritime regime to increase 
confidence-building and predictability. This is far more difficult in Asia than in Europe, 
not least because Asian states have been wary of efforts by Canada, Australia and others, 
to encourage security integration. But some development has occurred, notably in 
ASEAN and its dialogue partners, including the United States, Russia, China and Japan. 
The Asia Regional Forum, launched in 1993, proposed to examine non-offensive 
defence, arms proliferation, nuclear issues and common security.41 Although 
institutionalized naval cooperation for collective security is probably some way off, there 
may be progress in developing functional "low level" activity that will build confidence, 
such as common procedures to handle safety at sea, incidents at sea agreements and 
cooperation in maritime surveillance.42 Various fora for maritime discussions exist at 
both an official and "second track" level, such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
and the Maritime Cooperation Working Group of the Conference on Security 
Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region (CSCAP).  
CONCLUSION  
In important respects the Cold War tended to reinforce Mahanism in Western states. It 
underlined the apparent significance of navies as measures of power. That measure was 
especially significant to the United States because in competition with the Soviet Union it 
was a sphere in which it could claim and maintain superiority. The relevance of that 
competitive approach seems less important in the post-Cold War world. State 
governments and inter-governmental organizations such as NATO will continue to 
control navies and determine their use. The prospect of a world government is remote and 
not necessarily desirable anyway. But states are also having to reconsider their role in the 
international system as a consequence of the problems in identifying an enemy whose 
activities could lead to a system-threatening war, requiring Mahanist preparations and 
responses, the strengthening role of non-state actors in international politics, threats 
arising from non-military security, and globalization processes.  
However, the central tenet of Mahanism is clearly not dead in parts of the world where 
naval power is used to sustain regional ambitions, and it may also represent a latent threat 
to Western interest in the free movement of shipping. Yet the potential impact on 
traditional naval powers need not be exaggerated. For as long as naval ambitions are 
regionally-based, the most appropriate philosophy for the Western naval powers would 
be to encourage low-level confidence-building and identify areas of common concern to 
which the apparatus of state defence can contribute.  
Integration or role specialization at sea is essentially a political matter, and in this respect 
NATO cooperation may be exceptional. It would have been far-fetched a few years ago 
to predict that French warships would be operating in a combined NATO-WEU Adriatic 
task force delegated to Commander of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe 
(COMNAVSOUTH). But political conditions have changed and with them some of the 
old barriers to naval cooperation have come down. In operational terms, Western naval 
powers offer high levels of expertise, training, technology and interoperability with like-
minded navies. This sophistication is not matched elsewhere. But in the post-Cold War 
period the relative ease of deployment of warships and their ability to capitalize on the 
Cold War legacy of common doctrine and exercise experience, has made them highly 
significant elements in coalition building. The dissemination of Western tactical 
publications in unclassified form and such contacts as the Russia-UK-US (RUKUS) 
dialog offers the potential to broaden this process.  
From a naval perspective, the end of the Cold War creates conditions for extending the 
cooperative processes already successfully established by Western navies for war-
fighting to international peace support operations. The financial pressures on all navies, 
including the more capable "medium" powers is likely to impel reinforced 
multilateralism  even the Royal Navy has latterly become more enamored of European 
naval cooperation in a WEU framework. Even a White Paper on Security is conceivable 
in the future.43 From a Western perspective, navies will not cease to be instruments of 
state policy, but state policy will be increasingly difficult to define narrowly. In the post-
imperialist, post-mercantilist, post-Cold War world, national interests will be increasingly 
defined in multinational contexts. In effect, we are also entering a post-Mahanist world 
and navies will be expected to adapt accordingly.  
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